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RECENT DECISIONS
to be determined and thus, introduces a degree of consistency and
predictability of result into this area of law.
The essence of Miller, however, is not to be overlooked. The
Court is not merely formulating an exact rule or standard to be
procedurely applied but, instead, views interest analysis as merely
representing a consideration to be employed in the establishment of
a modem rule of law. Illustrative of this attitude is the Court's
recognition of the significance of countervailing considerations
which in its collective judgment should concern the disposition of
justice in a modern court. Miller, therefore, does not, as contended
by the dissent, adopt domicile per se as the controlling considera-
tion. Rather, the Court establishes a flexible approach which seems
to reduce the danger Qf such parochialism by qualitatively examin-
ing all relevant factors before a determination is reached.
X
TAXATION - CoomRATE SPIN-OFS - REORGANIZATION PLAN
MUST DISTRIBUTE EIGHTY PERCENT CONTROL To QUALIFY FOR
SECTION 355 NONRECOGNITION PROVISION.
In 1961, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (Pacific)
established the Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company (North-
west) and transferred all of its non-California assets and $100,000
to Northwest in exchange for all the Northwest stock and a
$2,000,000 demand note. In the same year Pacific distributed to its
shareholders transferable rights to purchase fifty-seven percent of
the Northwest stock at a price substantially less than its fair mar-
ket value. The remaining forty-three percent was disposed of
twenty-one months later through a similar offering. Taxpayers
exercised almost all of their rights to acquire the Northwest stock,
but failed to report the difference between the fair market value of
the stock and the option price paid as income from stock dividends
on their federal income tax returns. The Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Ninth Circuits disagreed on the qualification of the
Pacific spin-off for the nonrecognition of gain treatment that Sec-
tion 355 of the Internal Revenue Code, under certain circumstances,
affords to stockholders of a controlling corporation who receive
shares of the controlled subsidiary. On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court held that the fifty-seven percent distribution in
1961 was not protected by the corporate spin-off exemption since
section 355(a) (1) (D) requires that the distribution divest the con-
trolling corporation of at least eghty percent control of the con-
trolled corporation. This prerequisite could not be satisfied by
the Pacific step-transaction plan which was too indefinite to unite
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the two separate distributions. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S.
83 (1968).
Congress first permitted tax-free treatment of corporate spin-
offs' in Section 203(c) of the Revenue Act of 1924.2 This Act
expressly provided for such treatment since Congress believed that
spin-offs were economically indistinguishable from split-offs3 and
split-ups, 4 which at that time could be effected without the recog-
nition of gain.5
It soon became apparent, however, that the form of tax-free
spin-off permitted by section. 203(c) would lead to widespread
tax avoidance. A corporation, instead of declaring a taxable divi-
dend, could transfer cash or other liquid assets to a newly-formed
corporation, and distribute the stock of this spun-off corporation
to its own stockholders. The spun-off corporation, holding only
liquid assets, could be liquidated a short time thereafter at capital
gains rates. Gregory v. Helvering8 was the classic case in which
such a scheme was utilized. The Supreme Court held that mere
compliance with the pertinent reorganization sections would not
insure nonrecognition of gain if a bona-fide business purpose was
not the motivating factor in the reorganization.
This decision necessitated drawing the sometimes difficult
distinction between spin-offs serving a legitimate business purpose
and those serving as a tax-avoidance device.7  Congress reacted
by repealing the provision s and, after the passage of the Revenue
Act of 1934, any stock received by a stockholder in a spin-off was
taxable as a dividend to the extent that the fair market value of the
stock reflected the profits of the parent corporation. 9 This was
I "A spin-off occurs when a part of the assets of a corporation is
transferred to a new corporation and the stock in the latter is distributed
to the shareholders of the original corporation without a surrender by the
shareholders of stock in the distributing corporation." S. RE.. No. 781,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1951). See generally B. BirrzR, FEDERAL
INcOME, ESrAr & GIFT TAXATION 705 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 256-58.
3 In a split-off the stock of a corporate subsidiary is distributed to
the parent's stockholders who in turn surrender part of their stock in the
parent corporation. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 266-67 (1954).
See generally B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INcOME, ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION
705 (3d ed. 1964).
4 In a split-up, those stockholders receiving stock in the subsidiary cor-
poration surrender all of their stock in the parent corporation. B. Brrrmza &
J. EusTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
450-51 (2d ed. 1966).
5 H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924).
6293 U.S. 465 (1935).
7 Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965); Parshelesky's
Estate v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962); 3 J. MERTENS, LAW
or FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION §§20.55, 20.101 (1965).
8 S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1934).
9 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680, 712.
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true even when no tax avoidance scheme was present and the
spin-off was serving a legitimate business interest.
In 1951, Congress once again examined its policy regarding
spin-offs and was persuaded that business reasons could exist which
would justify granting tax-free status to such reorganizations.
Thus, nonrecognition of gain was once again restored in this area,
but both corporations had to intend to continue to actively conduct
business after the reorganization, and the spin-off could not be used
principally as a device for the distribution of dividends.
With the enactment of the present Code, Congress decided to
liberalize wherever possible the law concerning the nonrecognition
of gain in cases which involved mere rearrangement of the corpor-
ate structure, and to remove unwarranted restrictions on neces-
sary or desirable business transactions. 10 Congress undoubtedly
intended to encourage divisive reorganizations effected for legiti-
mate business purposes,11 but it also had another, purpose in re-
vising the 1951 amendment. It also tightened the requirements
of prior law, so that transactions which were in substance, though
not in form, dividend distributions, would be taxable under the
new Code at ordinary income rates.' 2  As a result, the condi-
tions which Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541"
10 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42, 50, 266-67 (1954); H. R.
REP'. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34, 40, App. 120-22 (1954).
"This congressional determination to remove unnecessary impediments
to tax-free reorganizations is apparent from the revisions made to the prior
law. By section 355(a) (2) (A), pro rata distributions of stock are no
longer necessary and subsection (a)(2)(B) has eliminated the necessity
of surrendering stock in the parent corporation.
The rationale behind the nonrecognition of gain or loss that section
355 provides is the congressional belief that no tax should be imposed
when the same people own the same exact business, the only change being
in its form and structure. Treas. Reg. § 1.355- 2 (c) (1955).
12 S. R.E. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954) ; H. R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1954).
This in part explains why the phrase "with respect to its stock" in
section 355 (a) (1) (A) replaced the more flexible clause "in pursuance of
a plan of reorganization," and the addition of the word "solely" before
"stock or securities." See Section 355(a) (2) (C) of the 1954 Code and
Section 112(b) (11) of the 1939 Code. Also, the requirement of section
355(a) (1) (D) that at least 80 percent control be distributed eliminated
the provisions which permitted post-spin-off control of the spun-off cor-
poration to be shared by both the parent corporation and its stockholders.
See Section 112(g)(1)(D) of the 1939 Code.
13Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 355, provides in relevant parts:
(a) Effect on Distributees-
(1) General rule. -If-(A) a corporation (referred to in this section as the "distributing
corporation")-
(i) distributes to a shareholder, with respect to its stock,
or . . . solely stock or securities of a corporation (referred to in this
section as "controlled corporation!') which it controls immediately
before the distribution,
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sets up are detailed and specific. The fact that it is an exemption
section alone would require that its terms be strictly construed. 4
In addition, the extreme length and complexity of the section,
imposing cumulative prerequisites to any nonrecognition of any
gain or loss, reflect congressional wariness in dealing with an
exemption which has previously been utilized in various tax
avoidance schemes.
Section 355 requires that the distributing corporation dis-
tribute all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation,
or an amount constituting eighty percent control.15 In light of
the step-transactions utilized in the Pacific plan, it becomes
relevant to examine previous judicial treatment of corporate re-
organizations when control was divested in a series of steps. The
courts have utilized the "step-transaction" theory to grant non-
recognition treatment to such divestitures. The rule is well estab-
lished that all the steps which are an integral part of a plan of
reorganization are to be considered as parts of a single trans-
action.'4 For example, the Ninth Circuit, examining a reorgani-
zation under Section 113(a) (7) of the 1928 Code in Commissioner
v. Schumacher Wall Board Corp.," held that the question of con-
(B) the transaction was not used principally as a device for the
distribution of earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or
the controlled corporation or both (but the mere fact that subsequent
to the distribution stock or securities in one or more of such cor-
porations are sold or exchanged by all or some of the distributees
(other than pursuant to an arrangement negotiated or agreed upon
prior to such distribution) shall not be construed to mean that the
transaction was used principally as such a device), [and] . . .(D) as part of the distribution, the distributing corporation distributes-
(i) all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation
held by it immediately before the distribution, or,(ii) an amount of stock in the controlled corporation constitut-
ing control within the meaning of section 368(c), and it is established
to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that the retention
by the distributing corporation of stock (or stock and securities) in
the controlled corporation was not in pursuance of a plan having as
one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to (and no amount shall be
includible in the income of) such shareholder or security holder on the
receipt of such stock or securities.
'4Helvering v. Northwest Steel Mills, 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940). For
a criticism of this policy, however, see Griswold, An Argument Against
the Doctrine that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter
of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1142 (1943).
25 Supra note 13.
26Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184-85
(1942); accord, Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
1793 F.2d 79, 81 (1937); accord, Transport Prod. Corp., 25 T.C. 853
(1956), aff'd mere., 239 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956); Portland Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940); Case v. Commissioner, 103
[ VOL. 43
RECENT DECISIONS
trol is to be determined by the situation existing at the time of the
plan's completion rather than at the termination of an intermediate
step. This rule applies generally to all types of reorganizations
which are treated in Subchapter C of the 1954 Code, including
those under section 355.8
Tax-free reorganizations are frequently effected over a period
of as many as several years. 19 This is permissible only because
the transitory steps of a legitimate plan can be disregarded under
the revenue acts when they add nothing of substance to the com-
pleted affair.20 The Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Alabanua
Asphaltic Limestone Co., characterized such steps as ". . . no
more than intermediate procedural devices utilized to enable the
new corporation to acquire all the assets of the old one pursuant
to a single reorganization plan." 21 Thus, mere lapse of time
between the various steps necessary to consummate a plan or
reorganization has never been considered a basis for loss of the
reorganization exemption status.
It is also recognized that the existence of a "formal plan"
is not required to bring the "step-transaction" theory into play
when one can be discovered from the circumstances surrounding
the reorganization.22  A review of the cases adopting this view,
however, exhibits the presence of a firm commitment to complete
the distribution.2 3  In Halliburton v. Commissioner,2" for ex-
F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1939); Von's Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 92 F2d 861(9th Cir. 1937).
13 Rev. Rul. 57-311, 1957-2 Cum. BuLt. 243; cf. W. E. Gabriel Fabri-
cation Co., 42 T.C. 545, 552 (1964), acquiescence 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 4.
19 Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1016 (1967) (over two years between distributions); Pearson
Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (fifteen
years between distributions); Roosevelt Hotel Co., 13 T.C. 399 (1949)(four years between distributions); D. W. Douglas, 37 B.T.A. 1122 (1938)
(five years between distributions).20 Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184
(1942) ; accord, Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938); United States
v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
21 Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 185(1942).
2 Transport Prod. Corp., 25 T.C. 853 (1956), aff'd nenm., 239 F.2d
859 (6th Cir. 1956) (finding plan in various discussions and negotiations);
accord, Fowler Hosiery Co., 36 T.C. 201 (1961); International Inv. Corp.,
11 T. C. 678 (1948), aff'd nem., 175 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1949).23Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1948)
(board of directors' resolution directing corporation's officers to take all
necessary and proper steps to immediately dissolve the corporation under
North Carolina law); Commissioner v. Schumacher Wall Board Corp., 93
F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1937) (a pre-existing contract binding the parties to so
distribute found a sufficient commitment); Rinkel v. Knox, 196 F. Supp.
21 (D. Minn. 1961) (independent corporation bound by contract to acquire
and distribute the stock of newly-formed corporation to its shareholders).2478 F.2d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1935).
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ample, the Ninth Circuit decided that a twenty-two day delay was
immaterial when a pre-existing contract set out in detail the
entire plan of transfer.
In the reorganization effected in the instant case, Pacific,
25
in order to achieve its own unique business objectives, strayed
from the explicit directives of section 355 and constructed a rather
unique stock distribution plan. It provided that only about
fifty-seven percent of the Northwest stock would be offered to
Pacific's stockholders immediately after the creation of North-
west, intending that the balance would be disposed of by Pacific
in one or two subsequent offerings timed to meet its needs for
additional capital. The plan also provided that, instead of dis-
tributing Northwest stock pro rata to the shareholders, Pacific
would distribute to its stockholders transferable rights entitling the
holders to purchase Northwest stock at an amount to be specified
by Pacific's Board of Directors.26  Under section 301,27 how-
ever, any such distribution of property by a corporation to its
stockholders out of accumulated earnings and profits is a divi-
dend taxable as ordinary income unless some specific exemption
section is applicable. 28 The Commissioner contended that the
1961 distribution of Northwest stock failed to qualify under
25 Pacific, a subsidiary of the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, provided communications services in the far West. American at all
times controlled approximately 90% of Pacific's stock.
26 Pacific issued to its common stockholders one right for each share
of Pacific. Six rights plus a payment of $16 were required to purchase
one share of Northwest. The second distribution was similar in form to
its 1961' counterpart, with the one exception that eight rights plus $16
were required to purchase one share of Northwest.
27Section 301(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a distribution of property
(as defined in section 317(a)) made by a corporation to a shareholder
with respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner provided in
subsection (c)."
Section 317(a) provides that "the term 'property' means money,
securities, and any other property. . . ." Section 301(c) (1) provides that
the "portion of the distribution which is a dividend (as defined in
section 316) shall be included in gross income."
Section 316 provides that "the term 'dividend' means any dis-
tribution of property made of a corporation to its shareholders-(1) out
of its earnings and profits. .. ."
Section 316(a) provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided in
this subtitle, every distribution is made out of earnings and profits to
the extent thereof...."
28 The fair market value of the Northwest stock on the date taxpayer
Gordon exercised his rights was $26, while its value was $26.94 on the
date taxpayer Baan exercised his rights. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, regarding the differences between the market value and option
price as a taxable dividend, subsequently determined that there was a
deficiency owed by taxpayers for the year 1961.
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section 355 in several different respects.29  However, the Supreme
Court, in remanding the cases to the Tax Court for further con-
sideration,30 rested its decision only on section 355(a)(1)(D).
It was in the Court of Appeals 31 that the Commissioner
first contended that section 355 (a) (1) (D) required that the stock
of the controlled corporation be distributed in a single distribution.
While the Supreme Court did not reach the issue in this case,
both circuit courts considered this question of law on the merits
and both rejected it.23 The Commissioner argued alternatively
that even if the "step-transaction" theory could be applied to
spin-offs under section 355, Pacific's plan was too indefinite to be
afforded such treatment. This is the precise issue on which the
Supreme Court based its decision. It is obvious that Pacific's
initial distribution in 1961 of fifty-seven percent of the North-
west stock transferred neither all of the Northwest stock held
by Pacific prior to the spin-off, nor "control" as that term is
defined in section 368(c)."' Thus, unless Pacific's two separate
distributions can be regarded as one under the "step-transaction"
theory, the spin-off involved can not qualify for nonrecognition
under section 355.
However, as the Gordon Court pointed out: "Clearly, if an
initial transfer of less than a controlling interest in the controlled
corporation is to be treated for tax purposes as a mere first step
in the divestiture of control, it must at least be identifiable as
2 Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 94 n.7 (1968).
3oThe issue the Tax Court now must consider is whether the distribu-
tion of Northwest stock by Pacific met the requirements for nonrecogni-
tion stated in either section 354 or section 346(b) of the Code. Id. at 90-91.
-31The two taxpayers had successfully contested the Commissioner's
assessment of a deficiency against them in a consolidated action before the
Tax Court, the court holding that the distribution qualified for the ex-
emption treatment provided by section 355. Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71(1965).
32 The Second Circuit rejected this contention completely. Commissioner
v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 1967). The Ninth Circuit, however,
while also rejecting the requirement of a single distribution, held that
"such distributions must not extend over any greater period of time
than is reasonably necessary . .. ," and rejected the twenty-one month
period which elapsed during Pacific's distribution as unreasonably long
under the circumstances. Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 498 (9th
Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court did not reach the precise issue of whether(a)(1)(D) would prohibit or limit a divestiture of control committed
from the outset but spread over a series of steps. Commissioner v. Gor-
don, 391 U.S. 83, 96-97 n.11 (1968).
33Section 368(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in
part that "the term 'control' means the ownership of stock possessing
at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares
of all other classes of stock of the corporation."
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such at the time it is made." "4 It is this requirement which the
Pacific plan failed to satisfy. The Second Circuit erroneously
adopted the taxpayers' contention that the requirements of sub-
section (a) (1) (D) were met when Pacific distributed the re-
maining forty-three percent of the Northwest stock in 1963. That
court had held that as long as the parent corporation has in fact
distributed all the stock of the subsidiary at the time the issue
arises, the requirements of this subsection have been fulfilled. 35
This, however, was an improper application of the Halliburton
"formal plan" rule, for Pacific's plan clearly lacked the pre-
requisite firm commitment to distribute the remaining stock. The
Second Circuit's holding was explicitly overruled by the Supreme
Court in the instant case, observing that ". . . if one transaction is
to be characterized as a 'first step' there must be a binding com-
mitment to take the later steps." 36 The Court found that in the
Northwest reorganization at no time prior to the second distribu-
tion did the Pacific stockholders have any enforceable rights to
the remaining forty-three percent of the Northwest stock. Al-
though its proxy statement stated that Pacific would offer fifty-
seven percent of the Northwest stock promptly after acquiring its
securities, as far as future distributions were concerned, Pacific's
"Plan for Reorganization" only indicated that the balance of the
stock would be offered for sale on one or more occasions within
the next few years.37  The prices were to be determined ". . . by
the Board . .. [of Pacific] at the time of each offering." 31
This plan left all the options to Pacific and no legal right
to the balance of the stock to the stockholders. All the terms
of the plan were left to the sole discretion of Pacific's Board of
Directors, the only possible restraint being "the capital require-
ments of Pacific." As Judge Friendly pointed out in his Gordon
dissent, a variety of events might have postponed Pacific's need
for cash and as a result, precluded the further distribution of the
remaining stock for many years.39
The Court did not reach the Commissioner's other contentions
regarding Pacific's reorganization. However, with a view towards
determining what requirements a corporation must fulfill in order
to be granted nonrecognition treatment under subsection (a) (1)
(D), it is interesting to examine their validity. 40  The Com-
-4 Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
35 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d. 499, 509 (2d Cir. 1967).
86 Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
117Id. at 97.
38 Id.
39 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 511 (2d Cir. 1967).4oSee generally Comment, Corporate Tax: Spin-offs Under Section
355: Commissioner v. Baan and Commissioner v. Gordon, 54 VA. L. REv.
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missioner's contention that section 355 required a single distribu-
tion of stock was prompted by the frequent references in the
section to things being done "immediately before," or "immedi-
ately after" the distribution, reasoning that this indicated a con-
gressional intent that a single distribution be required. More
likely, however, this section is simply the embodiment of the con-
gressional decision that only complete and not partial divisions
were to receive tax-free status.41  For example, similar language
is used in section 351, and is interpreted by Income Tax Regula-
tions section 1.351-1(a)(1) as follows:
The phrase 'immediately after the exchange' does not necessarily re-
quire simultaneous exchanges by two or more persons, but com-
prehends a situation where the rights of the parties have been pre-
viously defined and the execution of the agreement proceeds with an
expedition consistent with orderly procedure.4 2
The Commissioner contended that the principal purpose of
subsection (a)(1)(D) was to prevent a parent corporation from
making periodic distributions of small amounts of stock in a sub-
sidiary as a substitute for ordinary dividends.43  However, even
Professor Bittker admits that such an abuse would clearly be pro-
hibited by subsection (a) (1) (B) .4 4  The Commission is also free
to draft appropriate regulations outlining time limits, specifying
the number of steps permitted as part of a general plan, or
defining any of the statutory language.
Strangest of all the Commissioner's contentions was the
spectre of administrative chaos he raised as the probable result
if reorganizations under section 355 were permitted to encompass
different tax years. No administrative difficulties have previously
been encountered in applying exemption provisions to such re-
organizations.45 Various procedures are available to the Coin-
295 (196); Note, Incomne Tax: Plans and Periodic Distributions under
Section 355; Circuits Split on a New Judicial Gloss, 56 CALn. L. REv. 220(1963); 81 HARv. L. REv. 482 (1967).
413 J. MERTENs, LAW OF FEmE.L IxcomE TAxA oxs §20.102, at 512
(1965).d"Income Tax Regulations section 1.363-2(c) similarly interprets the
phrase "immediately after the acquisition" in section 368 (a)(1)(B) of the
1954 Code as permitting a series of acquisitions. And lastly, section
393(b)(1) of the 1954 Code clearly indicates that a section 355 spin-off
be made pursuant to a plan: "a plan to make an exchange or distribu-
tion which is described in section 355... shall be treated as a plan of
reorganization."
43 B. BrrTKPR & J. EusnicE, FmRAL IcomE TAxAnoN OF Co, oRA_-
TioNs & SrAREHOLDERs 479 (2d ed. 1966).
4 Id.
-5 Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
3S6 U.S. 1016 (1967) (over two years between distributions); Pearson
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missioner to protect the revenue in the event a reorganization is
not carried out according to plan. For instance, the Second
Circuit pointed out that the Commissioner was free to draft reason-
able revenue regulations to ameliorate any administrative problems
which might occur.46 In addition, by waiver of the statute of
limitations, or by the assessment of taxes and the filing of claims
for refunds, tax returns may be held open for final computation
until the reorganization is completed. In view of the congressional
intent to encourage business-motivated spin-offs whenever possible,
it would be inconsistent to allow surmountable administrative
problems to further complicate the already complex requirement
of section 355.
Another objection raised by the Commissioner and left un-
answered by the Court in the instant case related to subsection
(a) (1) (A). The Commissioner contended that Pacific, by dis-
tributing rights rather than the stock itself, failed to distribute
"solely stock or securities" as required by that subsection. Both
the Tax Court and the Second Circuit correctly rejected this
position, relying on the familiar "step-transaction" theory to hold
the substance rather than the form of the transaction controlling
-that the distribution in reality consisted of the stock itself and
not the initial stock rights.4 7 The distribution of a stock right has no
tax consequences since there is no distribution of corporate property
until the right is exercised. 4 It follows then that it was the actual
distribution of the Northwest stock that was the taxable event
Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (fifteen years
between distributions); Roosevelt Hotel Co., 13 T.C. 399 (1949) (four
years between distributions); D. W. Douglas, 37 B.T.A. 1122 (1938) (five
years between distributions).
46 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 1967).
7 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 91 (1965); Commissioner v. Gordon, 382
F.2d 499, 505 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Carlberg v. United States, 281
F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960); William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408 (1963). The
Ninth Circuit limited its holding to an assumption that the mere use of
stock rights in Pacific's plan, without the requirement of consideration,
would not disqualify it under section 355. Commissioner v. Baan, 382
F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1967). This is not a very significant holding, how-
ever, simply because stock rights are used in such reorganizations almost
exclusively as a convenient method to raise capital.
48 Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937); Miles v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247 (1922); Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684
(2d Cir. 1942). In Palmer the Court held that the mere distribution of
stock rights was not a dividend since the sales price represented the
reasonable value of the stock at the time of issuance. Here there was a
spread between the market value of the stock and its sales price. Thus this
spread was a distribution of corporate assets and, upon exercise of the
rights, was taxable as a dividend unless some exemption provision was
applicable.
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here,4 9 with the rights serving merely as a transitory step in the
final distribution thereof.
Lastly, the Commissioner contended that Pacific violated the
subsection (a) (1) (A) (i) requirement of a distribution "to a
shareholder, with respect to its stock," since a cash consideration
was necessary for the exercise of the rights distributed. While
the Court in the instant case did not consider this argument, the
Tax Court rejection of it was in order:
Had it [Pacific] distributed the Northwest stock directly to its stock-
holders without consideration there would clearly have been the type
of divisive organization contemplated by the statute, at least as far
as subparagraph (A) is concerned. And in our view, the situation
is not changed merely because that distribution was conditioned upon
payment of $16 a share by distributees. . . . If Congress had intended
that a distribution of the Northwest stock be treated as tax-free when
made without consideration, it is inconceivable that it could have
intended the transaction to result in taxable income to the distributees
where they paid out money in connection with receiving such stock.50
The Ninth Circuit accepted the Commissioner's contention
that the phrase "to a shareholder with respect to its stock" was
a term of art, used consistently throughout the Code to describe
situations in which a shareholder receives a share in corporate
assets solely because of his status as such, and without the pay-
ment of any consideration.51 The Commissioner cited no cases
or authorities in support of this position, but did cite several other
Code sections in analogy.5 2  An examination of these sections,
4 9There has been some suggestion that the expanded definition of
property in section 317 of the 1954 Code has now made it possible to regard
the mere issuance of rights as the taxable event. Whiteside, Income Tax
Consequences of Distributions of Stock Rights to Shareholders, 66 YALE
L.J. 1016, 1028-31 (1957); Comment, Taxation of Stock Rights, 51 CALIF. L.
REv. 146, 151 (1963). But Palmer assumed that the rights were valuable
at the date of issuance and yet still held they were not dividends. Similarly,
stock rights to acquire more stock in the same company have been held
to be a mere opportunity for the shareholders, in preference to strangers,
to participate in contributing capital to the company. Miles v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247, 251-52 (1922). Nor is there any evidence that
Congress intended to change Palmer and treat rights as taxable on issuance
rather than exercise. Indeed, section 301 was presented as being a mere
restatement of the provisions under section 115 (a, b, d, e, & j) of the
1928 Code. H. R. REP. No. 1377, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A70 (1954); S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1954). However, the Supreme Court
did not reach the question in this case since, the rights having been both
issued and exercised, the taxable event had dearly occurred. Commissioner
v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 89-90, n.4 (196S).5o Commissioner v. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 90 (1965).51 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1967).
5 The Commissioner cited sections 301, 305, 307, 311, and 312. Id. at
493, n.11.
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however, reveals that while the term is used to describe such dis-
tributions, the payment of consideration is certainly not prohibited.
Section 355 itself indicates that consideration may indeed be re-
quired in such reorganization plans without their resultant dis-
qualification. Section 355(a) (1) (A) (ii) permits a distribution
".. . to a security holder, in exchange for its securities, [of]
solely stock or securities of a corporation. . . ." Subsection
(a) (2) also permits an exchange of stock for stock in the dis-
tributing corporation. Section 1.301-1(J) of the Internal Revenue
Regulations provides that a sale of corporate assets to the share-
holders of a corporation at less than fair market value, is taxable
as a dividend.53 Such a sale then is considered a "distribution
. . . by a corporation with respect to its stocks" under section
301(a).54 This is the very section under which the Commissioner
sought to tax Pacific's distribution. Thus, he was placed in the
position of contending that a distribution for consideration was
not a distribution "to a shareholder with respect to its stock," at
the same time he was urging that the transaction was a taxable
"distribution . . . by a corporation with respect to its stock"
under section 301(a). While he admitted that both sections re-
ferred to distributions by a corporation with respect to its stock,
he attempted to escape this inconsistency by urging that section
355 related this provision to the distribution of "solely stock or
securities" while section 301 related it to the distribution of
"property as defined in Section 317(a)." Section 317(a) does
not limit its definition of property to stock, but includes under
it "any other property." The Commissioner concluded then that
Pacific's distribution of stock rights requiring a cash consideration
was a distribution of property within the meaning of section 301,
but not a distribution of solely stock or securities within the
meaning of section 355.55
It is submitted that the Commissioner's position is erroneous
in several respects. There is no justification for refusing to treat
a corporation's sale of spun-off assets in a spin-off reorganization
to its stockholders as a distribution under section 355. The spread
between .the option price and the market value of the Northwest
stock did not represent a dividend, but was merely the means of
effecting the distribution of the Northwest stock. The application
53 See Timberlake v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1942). See
generally 1 J. MtRm s, LAw oF FEDaEI. INcOmE TAXATION, § 9.22 at 58
(1962).
54 The Senate Finance Committee in its report on the 1954 Code also
stated that section 301 had application only to distributions of property to
shareholders in their capacity as such. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 231 (1954).
55 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
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of the "step-transaction" theory transforms Pacific's initial dis-
tribution into that of the Northwest stock, with the stock rights
serving merely as a mechanism to effect its final distribution.
Section 355 was invoked by the taxpayers not in respect to the
rights distributed, but to the stock received on their exercise.
As stockholders of Pacific, they exercised these rights only to
retain the same interest in Pacific which they held before the
spin-off occurred.
The Commissioner also contended that the very issuance of
transferrable rights was inconsistent with the general rationale
behind the Code's reorganization provisions-that a mere change
in corporate form has occurred when the shares of the two cor-
porations resulting from the spin-off are owned by the same stock-
holders of the parent corporation. The Ninth Circuit rejected
this contention, but did hold that a distribution "effectuated by
means of transferable stock rights, the exercise of which re-
quired substantial cash payments"56 would not qualify for non-
recognition treatment under section 355. The court reasoned
that the likely result of such a plan would be that a substantial
number of stockholders would sell their rights rather than make
the necessary cash payment, thus destroying the continuity of
interest required in such reorganizations.7
Since American owned approximately ninety percent of
Pacific's stock, it was clear from the outset that continuity of
interest would be retained. However, this is the exception rather
than the rule. For example, of the minority stockholders, over
one-third failed to acquire the Northwest stock to which they
had received rights, despite the fact that its option price was sub-
stantially lower than its fair market value. Usually, it will be
more probable that the continuity of interest requirement of sub-
section (a)(1)(D) will not be fulfilled whenever a corporation
without a dominant shareholder effectuates the distribution of its
stocks by transferable rights requiring cash consideration for
their exercise. It is submitted however that this mere probability
is not sufficient justification to declare all such distributions per se
violative of section 355 safeguards.
Criticism of section 355 as being too narrow in scope would
be manifestly unfair. Pacific simply failed to conform its elaborate
reorganization plan, designed to satisfy its own unique business
needs, to the requirements of the statute. What basically occurred
51 Conimissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1967).
5 See Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. .378 (1935); Treas.
Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1955); B. BTrrrKER & J. EusTicF, FED RAL INcOME TAXA-
TION oF CORPORATONS & STOCKHOLDoas 479, 508-16 (2d-ed. 1966). If such
continuity of interest is not present, the distribution then becomes, in effect,
a mere sale to strangers.
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was a bargain-sale 58 by Pacific of its assets in Washington,
Idaho, and Oregon to its stockholders. 59 Pacific in turn used the
proceeds of the sale to repay the funds which it had borrowed
from American to finance its previous expansion. However,
Pacific wanted only as much capital as it needed at that time,
since any excess would only have to be invested temporarily at
a low return. This was the underlying reason why only fifty-
seven percent of the Northwest stock was distributed in 1961.60
Accordingly, Pacific also took care to reserve the right to distribute
the remaining stock at a time and price to be established at the
discretion of its Board. Pacific did not commit itself in 1961
in regard to the future of its reorganization plan since it desired
to retain its flexibility and fulfill its needs as they developed.
In the very act of accomplishing its own business objectives,
Pacific failed to satisfy the requirements of section 355. Such
a plan is simply too indefinite to unite under the "step-transaction"
theory the eventual second distribution with the initial one.
While disqualification of Pacific's reorganization may seem
harsh, it should be clear that Congress did leave Pacific alternative
courses of conduct. Pacific could well have distributed "control"
immediately. Thus Pacifice could have held the remaining twenty
percent indefinitely, retaining at least partially its flexibility to
fulfill cash needs as they arose. On the other hand, Pacific could
have sacrificed its flexibility somewhat by bringing its plan under
the protection of the "step-transaction" doctrine. An initial dis-
tribution of fifty-six percent, accompanied by a firm commitment
to distribute the remaining forty-four percent in installments at
various specified dates, chosen on the basis of a projected study
of its future cash needs, would have enabled Pacific to retain
a large degree of flexibility and yet avoid any unfavorable invest-
ments at low returns. Or perhaps an initial distribution of fifty-
58A bargain-sale is a sale of corporate assets to the stockholders of a
corporation at less than fair market value. The difference between the fair
market value and the sale price is taxable as a dividend. See generally 1 J.
MErENfs, LAw oF FEDEaM. Ixcom- TAXATiON § 9.22, at 58 (1962).59See Gibson v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1943).0oThis percentage was also convenient in the sense that it effectively
enabled American to acquire more than 50% control of Northwest. Pacific
also feared that a simple distribution of Northwest stock would encounter
obstacles under California corporate law. Pacific's attorneys had advised
that if the Northwest stock was distributed without the payment of con-
sideration by Pacific's shareholders, the distribution would have to be
charged against its earned surplus. This earned surplus, however, would
have been insufficient for this purpose unless a reduction surplus of capital
was set up. Pacific was further advised that this reduction surplus could
not be legally utilized under California law as long as any of its preferred
shares remained outstanding. It is admitted that this advice was quite
possibly erroneous. See Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 79 (1965).
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six percent accompanied by a firm commitment to distribute the
remaining twenty-four percent needed to fulfill the "control" re-
quirement, at a date chosen after similar studies, would have best
suited Pacific's needs. Utilizing such a staggered distribution
would have enabled Pacific to retain even more flexibility by
holding the remaining twenty percent indefinitely for unexpected
capital emergencies. Thus it is clear that subsection (a)(1)(D)
does not inhibit in any great degree the type of refinancing pro-
gram Pacific attempted here. A corporation with similar financial
considerations will simply have to choose between the alternative
methods of distribution available if nonrecognition treatment under
section 355 is to be granted.
While section 355 has been successful in preventing the tax
avoidance schemes, it is not yet clear whether its requirements
are so complex as to also effectively hinder the type of corporate
reorganization Congress wished to encourage. Thus far, each of
the circuit courts in these cases has given extreme interpretations
of this section. It is vitally important to avoid giving a revenue
statute an overtechnical and forced reading. Thus a future re-
jection of the Commissioner's contentions regarding 355's require-
ment of a single distribution is in order. Yet a court must also
give a statute its plain and rational meaning."1 The Supreme
Court recognized in this case that in addition to the subsection
(a) (1) (B) requirement that the spin-off have a valid business
objective, Congress saw fit to establish several other detailed and
specific requirements which must be satisfied before nonrecognition
will be granted.62 At this point, however, the Supreme Court
has limited its interpretation of section 355 to a holding that a
plan must present a binding commitment to distribute the re-
maining shares of stock before two separate transactions made
pursuant to it can be considered as one under the "step-transaction"
doctrine.
61Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
6 2 Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1968).
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